Cash pooling is a powerful tool to consolidate intragroup liquidity for multi-divisional corporations. This paper develops a centralized supply chain model that aims to assess the value of cash pooling.
Introduction
The fundamental objective of supply chain management is to eciently coordinate material, information, and nancial ows to reduce mismatches between demand and supply. When nancial markets are ecient, i.e., external funding is plentiful and relatively inexpensive, the nancial decisions can be decoupled from the logistics decisions (Modigliani and Miller 1958) . In this case, a downstream entity pays material it orders from an upstream entity so nancial ow becomes the output of logistics decisions. This perspective may explain why the supply chain literature has largely focused on the integration of material and information ows. Nonetheless, with the recent global nancial crisis limiting the availability of external funding, many multinational, multi-divisional corporations in their hunt for cash have witnessed a signicant increase on their intragroup nancial transactions (Rogers et al. 2009 ). The reason is simple: these multinationals realized that they can concentrate the intragroup liquidity for centralized planning to receive more benet. For example, Hewlett-Packard and General Electric transferred funds from their oversea divisions to domestic ones for the sake of the entire company group (Linebaugh 2013) . One common practice of cash concentration is cash pooling (Polak and Klusacek 2010) . Under cash pooling, the headquarter creates a corporate master account that aggregates divisions' cash on a daily basis (Jansen 2011) . While the value of cash pooling has been discussed in the nance literature, there is little study that assesses the value from a supply chain perspective. Indeed, the discussion of integrating nancial ows into supply chain models is relatively sparse in the supply chain literature. The objective of this paper is to ll this gap.
We consider a corporation that owns a supply chain consisting of two divisions (can be generalized to N divisions). The downstream division, division 1, replenishes inventory from an upstream division, division 2, which further replenishes from an outside ample vendor. There is a positive delivery lead time for both divisions. Division 1 is the headquarter that faces stochastic customer demand. The demands are independent between periods but not necessarily identical. Division 1 receives cash payment from customers who order the material. Similarly, division 2 pays to the outside vendor for the material shipped. To make the consideration of nancial ow relevant, we assume that there is no external borrowing. The decision is centralized and the headquarter has to decide a system-wide inventory replenishment and cash retention policy. The cash retention policy refers to how much cash the supply chain should hold for operations, i.e., inventory payments in our context. Typically, rms do not wish to hold excess cash as it loses the potential benet from external investments; on the other hand, liquidating the invested assets to assist operations incurs transaction costs, or may not be feasible in some cases (Baumol 1952, Miller and Orr 1966) . Thus, the headquarter has to nd a balance between the cash retained for internal operations and that invested for external assets.
We consider two cash management systems that represent dierent levels of cash concentration.
For the cash pooling system, a nancial services platform is adopted, and the entire supply chain is operated under a single account for conducting nancial transactions with customers and the outside vendor. For the transfer pricing system, no such platform is installed and the headquarter makes the joint decision under a two-account regime: each division maintains its own cash and division 1 pays exactly what it orders to division 2 according to a xed internal transfer price, i.e., the price that a selling division charges for a product or service supplied to a buying division of the same corporation (Abdallah 1989) . We assume that the transfer price is pre-determined according to a market price (Martini 2011 ). There are linear holding and backorder costs related to the inventory. In addition, there is opportunity cost of holding cash for internal operations. The objective is to nd a joint inventory replenishment and cash retention policy such that the total supply chain cost is minimized within a nite horizon under each of the cash management systems.
The logistics system of the considered supply chain is a seminal model proposed by Clark and Scarf (1960) . We incorporate cash ows into this classical model. The transfer pricing model represents a traditional supply chain in the sense that cash ow is driven by the inventory decision (constrained by the available cash). Thus, cash may not be eciently distributed, leading to a less eective inventory and cash retention policy. For example, cash shortage of the upstream division will aect its normal operations, which, in turn, aects the material supply to the downstream one. This ineciency can be mitigated under cash pooling because the headquarter can consolidate the cash within the supply chain for better usage. In practice, there are physical pooling and notional (virtual) pooling (i.e., funds are not physically transferred but managed as if they were in a single account). In any case, cash pooling usually requires nancial and legal services provided by a third party and installing a costly system-wide technology platform, such as treasury management system, for transferring funds from divisions to the headquarter (Camerinelli 2010 ). Thus, our study of comparing these two systems can be used to justify the value of adopting such nancial services and technology platforms.
We rst formulate a dynamic program for the cash pooling model which includes two inventory states and one cash state (the corporate master account). To be consistent with the inventory literature, we name division and stage interchangeably. The problem is dicult to solve as one cannot directly prove a structured joint optimal policy. Nevertheless, by redening the state variables into echelon terms, we can transform the original two-stage system into a three-echelon system, under which the optimal joint policy can be characterized. The optimal policy is surprisingly simple. The inventory policy has the same structure as that of the traditional multi-echelon system (cf. Clark and Scarf 1960) : each stage reviews the echelon inventory position at the beginning of a period and orders up to a target echelon base-stock level. For the cash retention policy, stage 1 (or the headquarter) reviews the entire system working capital (= inventory on hand at both stages + inventory in transit -backorders at stage 1 + inventory-equivalent total system cash) at the beginning of each period and retains the cash holding within an interval determined by two threshold values. A key technical contribution is that we simplify the computation by decoupling the original dynamic program with three states into three separate dynamic programs, each with one state variable. Thus, the optimal policy parameters can be easily calculated. The decoupling result is based on a set of penalty cost functions, some appearing to be new in the literature.
Solving the transfer pricing model is more involved. Simply speaking, the problem is similar to a serial capacitated system (cf. Parker and Kapuscinski 2004) in the sense that the on-hand cash level at each stage can be viewed as a budgetary constraint that restricts the amount of inventory ordering. However, a major dierence between the traditional capacitated system and ours is that the cash constraint is endogenously determined by the inventory and cash retention decisions. Although we are not able to characterize the optimal policy, we provide a lower bound to the optimal cost by connecting the transfer pricing model to an assembly system (c.f. Rosling 1989) with two component ows stage 1's cash ow and the system's material ow.
We obtain several insights. First, the optimal policy of the cash pooling model suggests that the inventory decision can be made separately from the cash retention decision; however, making the cash retention decision has to take into account the entire supply chain inventory. That is, monitoring system working capital level is key to ensuring the system eciency. In most rms, the cash retention decision is made by a treasurer in the nance department, and the replenishment decision is made by an inventory manager in the operations department. An implication of our nding is that a close interdepartmental collaboration is crucial. Second, one of the most important nancial decisions for a rm is to decide how much cash to hold in order to cope against the volatility of the external environment (Opler, et al. 1999 , Ramirez et al. 2007 , Baum et al 2008 . We consider demand volatility and nd that when the demand becomes more variable, the supply chain will simultaneously increase the amount of cash and inventory holdings. Nonetheless, the change of cash holding is relatively smaller than that of inventory holding. Thus, our analysis is useful for rms to decide an optimal liquid-asset mix (i.e., cash and inventory). Third, comparing the optimal cost of the cash pooling model and the lower bound cost of the transfer pricing model renders the (conservative) value of cash pooling, or equivalently, installing the nancial services platform. Our numerical result suggests that the value of cash pooling can be very signicant when the markup of the upstream stage is low and the demand is increasing or when the markup is high and the demand tends to be stationary. For the former case, the upstream division tends to have a cash shortage in the transfer pricing model. Lacking cash at the upstream stage restricts the order quantity, which aects the material supply for the downstream stage. On the other hand, for the latter case, there is excess cash accumulated in the upstream division. Pooling cash together will facilitate the headquarter to invest the excess cash to external assets.
A natural extension of the transfer pricing model is how much benet can be recovered if the headquarter can determine an optimal transfer price. Determining transfer prices is one of the most important topics for multi-divisional rms in the nance literature (see 2) . When an inventory manager attempts to determine the optimal ows of products among divisions, the price of a product is almost always considered as a given parameter. However, this is not the case in real multi-divisional rms since the transfer price is inherently subjective and the headquarter can determine it with some degree of exibility through advance pricing agreements (Martini 2011 ) . Thus, one can treat transfer pricing as a tool of re-distributing cash between divisions (Stewart 1977) . We refer to the system with optimized internal transfer price as the optimal pricing system. The optimal transfer price can be determined from the optimal order quantity and the optimal cash payment between these two divisions in each period (i.e., transfer price equals to cash payment divided by order quantity) . In other words, we need to obtain an optimal joint inventory replenishment, cash payment, and cash retention policy for the supply chain. Interestingly, this joint optimal policy can be obtained by extending the solution approach for the cash pooling model. More specically, the inventory replenishment and cash retention policy structure remains the same as those in the cash pooling system; for the payment between divisions, division 2 monitors its echelon working capital and receives payment up to a target level.
In a numerical study, we nd that optimizing the transfer price can recover a big portion of the cash pooling benet. However, the benet decreases when the lead time is long or the cash holding cost rates are signicantly dierent between the divisions. The benet of re-distributing liquidity through the optimal transfer price can be clearly demonstrated in the product life cycle example in 5: during the introduction and growth stages, the upstream division is normally short of cash so a cash subsidy through increasing the transfer price is valuable. On the other hand, during the mature and decline stages, the upstream division has accumulated sucient funds for the decreased demand, so a reduction of cash payment through decreasing the transfer price is benecial.
Our focus is to determine the system-wide optimal transfer price. Certainly, an optimal transfer price may not be aligned with each division's best interest, so there is a separate issue regarding how to implement the optimal transfer prices for the divisions. However, if implementing the optimal transfer price decreases the supply chain's cost, the headquarter can capture this benet and design an incentive compatible compensation, such as side payment, that induces the division to accept the transfer price.
In our context, the optimal cash payment between two divisions can broadly include intragroup loans or nancial subsidies.
Literature Review
Our work is related to four streams of research in the literature: cash management, multi-echelon inventory models, capacitated inventory models, and inventory models with nancial issues.
For cash management in single rms, most papers treat cash as inventory and use inventory control tools to nd the optimal cash balance for rms. Baumol (1952) studied the optimal cash level for a rm that uses cash either for paying transactions or for investment. We have a similar setup for the headquarter in our model. This line of research was further extended by Tobin (1956) and Miller and Orr (1966) . For dynamic, periodic-review cash balance problems, Girgis (1968) modeled the selection of a cash level in anticipation of future net expenses as a single-product, multi-period inventory system. Heyman (1973) presented a model to minimize the average cash balance subject to a constraint on the probability of stock-out. The dierence between these studies and ours is that we specically model the cash and inventory dynamics as two inter-related ows.
For cash management in multi-divisional corporations, our model is related to resource allocation from a centralized planning perspective. This literature can be categorized into two groups. The rst group is related to cash pooling. Most literature focuses on how cash pooling is implemented for multinational rms and discusses its potential benets, e.g., Wündisch (1973) dierent from these papers in that we consider a supply chain setting in a nite horizon and characterize the optimal control policy. There is another stream of research regarding how to design transfer prices to coordinate decentralized divisions (i.e., each division has high autonomy and is treated as a prot center). Since the focus is dierent from our paper, we refer the interested reader to Ronen and McKinney (1970) , Yeom et al. (2000) , and references therein.
Our research is also related to the multi-echelon literature. In particular, our model incorporates cash ows into the seminal supply chain model developed by Clark and Scarf (1960) , who proved that an echelon base-stock policy is optimal. Furthermore, they showed that the problem can be decoupled into a series of one-dimensional dynamic programs by introducing the notion of echelon inventories. Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) and Chen and Zheng (1994) streamlined the analysis by considering an innite horizon model. Recently, Angelus (2011) considered a multi-echelon model which allows each stage to dispose excess inventory to a secondary market. He introduced a class of heuristic policies, called disposal saturation policies, which can be obtained by using the Clark-Scarf decomposition.
The capacitated inventory problem is related to our model since the cash constraint on inventory replenishment can be viewed as the supply capacity. For single-stage systems, Federgruen and Zipkin (1986) showed that the modied base-stock policy is optimal. Angelus and Porteus (2002) derived the optimal joint capacity adjustment and production plan with and without carryover of unsold inventory units. Their capacity adjustment decision is similar to our cash retention decision, but our cash holding amount is also aected by payment decisions and random sales. For serial systems, Parker and Kapuscinski (2004) demonstrated that a modied echelon base-stock policy is optimal in a two-stage system where there is a smaller capacity at the downstream facility. Glasserman and Tayur (1995) and Huh et al. (2010) studied the stability issue of the system. The main dierence between the serial capacitated models and ours is that the cash constraint is endogenously determined by the inventory and cash decisions.
Finally, there have been several recent studies to incorporate nancial decisions or budget constraints into inventory models. Most of these papers are based on single-stage systems. Buzacott For multi-echelon models, Hu and Sobel (2007) studied a serial inventory model with the objective of optimizing the expected present value of dividends. They showed that there is no optimal echelon base-stock policy if there are nancial constraints. Protopappa-Sieke and Seifert (2010) conducted a simulation study on a two-stage supply chain to reveal qualitative insights on the allocation of working capital between the supply chain partners. Chou et al. (2013) studied a one-warehouse-multi-retailer system with trade credits. They showed that a longer trade credit term received from the external supplier may not lead to a longer trade credit term provided to the retailers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 3 studies the cash pooling model and formulates the corresponding dynamic program. 4 focuses on the transfer pricing model. We provide lower bounds to the optimal cost. 5 discusses the qualitative insights through a numerical study. 6 concludes.
Appendix provides proofs. Throughout this paper, we dene
Cash Pooling System
We consider a periodic-review, two-stage serial supply chain where stage 1 orders from stage 2, which orders from an outside ample vendor. The supply chain is owned by a single corporation, with stage 1 being the headquarter and stage 2 the subsidiary. Stage 1 faces a stochastic customer demand D t in period t. The demands are independent between periods, but the demand distributions may dier from period to period. We assume that unsatised demand is fully backlogged, and the material lead time is one period for both stages (without loss of generality).
This section focuses on the cash pooling (CP) system, in which the headquarter (stage 1) creates a corporate master account that aggregates the divisions' cash. Here and in the sequel, we use prime to indicate local (stage specic) variables and parameters. After receiving the customer's payment, the headquarter decides the amount of cash that will be used for external investments, such as money and bond markets, facility expansion, or R&D etc. The remaining cash will be used for operations, that is, paying inventory ordered to the outside vendor. Figure 1 shows the material and cash ows in solid and dashed arrows, respectively. The circle in Figure 1 represents the external investment portfolio on assets; the top white rectangle represents the master account. We assume that the external investment portfolio has a return rate of η ′ . Since holding cash for operations has zero return rate, η ′ can be viewed as cash holding cost rate, which represents the opportunity cost of holding cash (Allen and Hafer 1984) ! . Moreover, we assume that the headquarter can liquidate its portfolio assets to assist inventory ! Allen and Hafer (1984) conducted an empirical study that shows the cash holding cost rate is positively correlated to a company's interest return on short-term money markets and long-term on bond markets. We now introduce the other cost parameters. Following the inventory literature, we charge a linear local holding cost h ′ i for each unit of inventory held at stage i in each period, and a backorder cost b
for each unit of backorder incurred at stage 1 in each period. Here, we assume that h
holding a unit of inventory at downstream is more costly than that at upstream, and holding a unit of inventory is more costly than holding the same value amount of cash. The later is generally true since inventory holding cost consists of both the nancial opportunity cost and the physical shelf cost.
The inventory replenishment and cash retention decision is made centrally by the headquarter. The sequence of events in a period is as follows: At the beginning of the period, (1) shipments are received at both stages; (2) payment is made to the outside vendor; (3) cash retention decision is made; (4) orders are placed at both stages. During this period, demand is realized and sales revenue is collected.
At the end of the period, all inventory and cash related costs are calculated. The planning horizon is T periods, and the objective is to minimize the supply chain's total expected discounted cost within the entire horizon.
We now dene state and decision variables. For stage i = 1, 2 and period t, let
x ′ 1,t = net inventory level at stage 1 after Event (1);
x ′ 2,t = on hand inventory level at stage 2 after Event (1); w ′ t = cash balance in the pooled account after Event (2); v t = amount of cash transferred into the pooled account in Event (3); z i,t = order quantity for stage i made in Event (4); " The sequence of K ′ t can be generalized to a Markov chain that captures the stochastic liquidity level according to the market condition.
Note that v + t is the cash amount that ows into the pooled account and v − t is the cash amount that ows out for investment. Clearly, v t cannot exceed K ′ . Let p 1 be the unit selling price to the end customer and c be the unit procurement cost from the outside vendor. We assume c < p 1 to ensure protability. The system dynamics are shown below:
We assume that the actual payment transaction occurs upon the receipt of shipments. That is, the outside vendor will not receive the payment determined in period t until period t + 1, when stage 2 receives the shipment (placed in period t). This payment practice is similar to a Letter of Credit (LC).
In other words, we can view that there is a one-period lead time for the cash payment.
For the cash dynamic in (3), we assume that the customer will pay at the order epoch. This
assumption is reasonable as all demand will be lled under the backorder model. It is also commonly seen in practice (such as iPhone) and in the dynamic pricing literature, e.g., Federgruen and Heching (1999) . We do not include inventory holding and backorder costs in (3) because inventory holding cost is usually not incurred in the periodic cash transactions, and backorder cost usually represents loss of goodwill, which is a non-monetary cost.
The rst constraint states that stage 1's order quantity cannot exceed stage 2's on-hand inventory; the second constraint states that stage 2's order quantity is constrained by the cash balance in the pooled account, which also implies that the investment amount in each period cannot exceed its on-hand cash
Finally, the last constraint imposes a limit K ′ on the amount of cash that can be injected into the pooled cash account.
The single-period expected cost function iŝ
The rst line in the cost function is the inventory-related cost, which includes inventory holding, backlogging and procurement costs. 
withV T +1 (x ′ , w ′ ) = 0. Here we assume a zero terminating cost for simplicity. In the sequel, we omit the terminating cost from the dynamics program if it equals to zero.
The local formulation in (5) and (6) is dicult to solve. Specically, one can show the joint convexity ofĴ t (·) and derive a state-dependent global minimum solution. However, computing the solution is quite hard due to the curse of dimensionality. In the next section, we transform the original problem into a new system, from which the exact optimal joint policy can be shown to have a surprisingly simple structure.
Echelon Formulation
We transform the original two-stage system into a three-stage serial model by introducing new system variables. First, dene the following echelon variables:
. We refer to x as the echelon net inventory level, and w as the net working capital level measured in inventory unit, which is obtained by converting cash to inventory at the value of c.
This state transformation explicitly treats cash as inventory. More specically, the nancial ow in the system can be seen as an extension of the material ow after ipping the corporate master account to upstream. We dene the corresponding echelon decision variables:
Let y = (y 1 , y 2 ). Figure 2 shows the transformed CP system. With this transformation, the cash account becomes stage 3 in the new system, directly supplying stage 2. We hereby call echelon 3 (with state variable w) as the system working capital.
Similar to the multi-echelon inventory model, we derive the echelon holding cost rate as follows: Figure 2 : The three-stage transformed cash pooling system.
terms, the state dynamics in (1)-(3) become
and the constraint set becomes
We further specify the holding and backorder cost associated with each echelon:
Then, we can rewrite the dynamic program in (5) and (6) as follows:
V t (x, w) = min y,r∈S(x,w)
where the single-period cost function can be shown as
We refer to (7) and (8) as the echelon formulation of the CP model.
The Optimal Policy
We rst state the optimal joint policy for the CP model, which includes two types of decisions made through four control parameters (y * 1 , y * 2 , l * , u * ) in each period. For the inventory ordering decisions, each stage implements an echelon base-stock policy. That is, stage i reviews its x i at the beginning of each period. If x i < y * i , it orders up to y * i or as close as possible if its upstream does not have sucient stock; otherwise, it does not order. For the cash retention decision, stage 1 reviews w: if w > u * , it disposes cash down to the maximum of u * and x 2 ; if w < l * , it retrieves cash up to l * or as close as possible (due to the upper bound K); otherwise, it does not transfer cash.
For the traditional multi-echelon inventory model, there exists an equivalence result between echelon and local base-stock policies. Namely, each stage will generate exactly the same inventory orders based on the local and echelon policies # ; see, e.g., Chapter 8 of Zipkin 2000. This result can dramatically simplify the implementation of the optimal policy as each stage can monitor its local information to execute the optimal policy. We have a similar result here: the optimal echelon policy (y * 1 , y * 2 , l * , u * )
can be converted back to the local term (y
and u ′ * = u * − y * 2 . In this way, the procurement department of stage i can implement a local basestock policy based on its local inventory level x ′ i ; the accounting department of the headquarter can implement a local two-threshold policy based on the master account cash position w ′ .
We next explain how the optimal policy is derived and how to calculate these policy parameters. This is done by transforming a three-state dynamic program into three, single-dimensional dynamic programs. We summarize the main result in the following proposition.
We dene f i,t (·) as the expected optimal cost for echelon i in period t. Starting from echelon 1, we have f 1,t (x 1 ) = H 1,t (x 1 ) + min
Let g 1,t (y 1 ) = αE Dt f 1,t+1 (y 1 −D t ). Then, the optimal control parameter y * 1,t can be obtained by solving the minimization problem: y * 1,t = arg min
} .
Now, we express the expected optimal cost functions of echelon 2 as follows:
Similar to echelon 1, let g 2,t (y 2 ) = cy 2 + αE Dt f 2,t+1 (y 2 − D t ) and y * 2,t = arg min y 2
Note that Γ 2,t (·) and Γ 3,t (·) are the so-called induced penalty cost functions dened in Clark and Scarf (1960), i.e.,
Here, Γ 2,t (·) represents the penalty cost charged to echelon 2 if stage 2 cannot ship up to stage 1's target base-stock level y * 1,t . Although bearing the same structure, Γ 3,t (·) has a dierent economic meaning: it represents the penalty cost charged to the headquarter's accounting department (which manages the master account), if it fails to hold sucient cash to pay for the inventory procurement up to the target echelon base-stock level y * 2,t .
There are new penalty cost functions Λ 2,t (·) and Λ 3,t (·) in (10) and (11) . To illustrate their meanings, we dene
In such a case, the extra cost g 3,t (x 2 ) − U t (x 2 ) incurred at echelon 3 should be charged to echelon 2 due to its excess inventory. For this reason, we call Λ 2,t (x 2 ) the excess inventory penalty. (Recall that Γ 2,t (x 2 ) is the penalty cost charged to echelon 2 due to insucient inventory holding.) The cash retention control thresholds can be obtained from the following equations:
With a similar logic, Λ 3,t (w) in (18) can be explained: this is a self-induced penalty cost charged to echelon 3 if the system working capital w is less than l * t − K due to too much cash disposal in the previous period. In this case, stage 1 is penalized with the extra cost g 3,t (w + K) Function f 3 (·) is shown as the bold convex curve connected by four dierent functions, which are, from the right to the left, the linear function U (·), the convex function g 3 (·), the linear function L(·), and the convex function g 3 shifted from point (l * , g 3 (l * )) to point (l * − K, L(l * − K)); the induced penalty function Λ 3 (w) is the dierence between f 3 (w) and L(w) to the left of l * − K; the induced penalty function Λ 2 (x 2 ) is the dierence between g 3 (x 2 ) and U (x 2 ) to the right of u * . Figure 3 2 . The rest of the notation remains the same as that in 3. Figure 4(a) shows the material and nancial ows of the TP model.
The inventory dynamics of the TP model are identical to the CP model, as in equation (1) and (2).
Due to separate accounts, the cash dynamics of the TP model become
We again assume the payment to stage 2 occurs upon the receipt of shipment.
The constraint set for the TP model iŝ
As shown in the rst inequality, p 2 z 1 cannot exceed the available cash (w
The dynamic program of the TP model can be expressed as follows:
The TP model is essentially a serial inventory problem with capacities (in the form of cash constraints) at both stages. However, these constraints are random and endogenous, which are dierent from those assumed in the traditional capacitated inventory model (e.g., Parker and Kapuscinski 2004).
We are not able to obtain the exact optimal joint policy for the TP model. Nonetheless, we can we can connect the TP problem to an assembly system from which the lower bound cost is derived.
Echelon Formulation
We shall create a dierent echelon transformation scheme for the TP model. Dene
Here, x and y are the same as in the CP model; w 1 is dened to be stage 1's working capital (in inventory units); w 2 is dened as stage 2's echelon working capital, which includes inventory at both stages and stage 2's cash balance (in inventory units). With these state transformations, we redene the echelon holding cost parameters for the TP model: 
As shown in Figure 4(b) , the transformed TP system is similar to an assembly system. We further redene the holding and backorder cost associated with each echelon as
The echelon formulation of the TP model becomes (25) V t (x, w) = min y,r 1 ∈S(x,w) J t (x, w, y, r 1 ), (26) where the single-period cost function can be shown as
After the new transformation, some of the complexities caused by the endogenous constraints disappear. More specically, the dynamics of the new echelon variable w 1 no longer depend on z 1 .
However, the dynamics of echelon w 2 still depend on the decision y 1 − x 1 associated with echelon 1, as shown in (25) . This unique property undermines the decomposition structure in the CP model and dierentiates the TP model from the traditional assembly system (Rosling 1989 ). Below, we derive lower bounds to the optimal cost of the TP model.
Lower Bounds
This subsection establishes two lower bounds to the optimal cost for the TP model. Recall that the TP model is similar to an assembly system. The main idea of constructing these lower bounds is to decompose this assembly system. Specically, the expression of S(x, w) indicates that stage 1's decision y 1 is subject to two constraints: one is y 1 ≤ r 1 ≤ w 1 + K, which represents the cash constraint on the order quantity; the other is y 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ y 2 ≤ w 2 , which can be viewed as a material order constraint in a two-stage system with an endogenous, random capacity w 2 at the upstream stage 2. 
21) (or, equivalently, x 1 ≤ y 1 ≤ min{r 1 , x 2 }) implies a similar structure to an assembly system: the same amount of inventory and cash equivalent are matched through replenishment at stage 1.
To derive a lower bound to the optimal cost, we relax the above matching constraint by assuming that the components can be ordered and sold separately. As a result, the original system is decoupled into two independent subsystems as shown in Figure 5 
] .
Now, let us dene
Note that H 1,t (x 1 ) = H 1 1,t (x 1 ) + H 2 1,t (x 1 ), hence G 1 t (x 1 , w 1 , r 1 ) + G 2 t (x 1 , x 2 , w 2 , y 2 ) = G t (x, w, y 2 , r 1 ).
With this cost allocation, the dynamic program for Subsystem 1 can be expressed as
And the dynamic program for Subsystem 2 is , w) and t.
Proposition 2 shows that for any combination of (h 1 1 , h 2 1 ) and (b 1 , b 2 ), the sum of the two subsystems forms a cost lower bound to the original system. Maximizing expected cost over all combinations of h 1 and b yields the best lower bound.
The remaining question is how to nd the optimal cost of these subsystems. A careful examination of Subsystem 1 described in (32) reveals that it is the echelon transformation for a single-stage system with a joint inventory and cash retention decision. Thus, we can characterize the optimal joint policy, i.e., using the base-stock policy to control the inventory replenishment and the two-threshold policy to manage the working capital level.
Solving Subsystem 2 is more dicult. The dynamic problem described in (33) is the echelon expression of a two-stage inventory model with random, endogenous capacity at the upstream stage.
There exists no known optimal policy for this model. Thus, we provide two approaches to further develop a lower bound to the optimal cost for Subsystem 2.
Constraint Relaxation (CR) Bound
We form the lower bound by relaxing the constraint y 2 ≤ w 2 at stage 2. Once w 2 is removed from the constraint set, it only appears in the single-period cost function in the dynamic program. The following lemma characterizes the expected value of w 2 through the ow conservation. Lemma 1. Given the initial states w 2,1 and x 1,1 , for any policy we have
Recall that in the single-period cost function (31), the function H 3,t (w 2 ) is a linear function of w 2 . Therefore, by using Lemma 1, we can replace H 3,t (w 2 ) with H 3,t (ρx 1 + B t ) without aecting the optimal decision in each period. With this construction, w 2 can be replaced by x 1 and Subsystem 2 becomes a classical two-stage serial system in which Clark and Scarf 's algorithm can be applied to nd the optimal echelon base-stock levels for both stages. The CR bound generally works well when the constraint y 2 ≤ w 2 is not binding, i.e., when stage 2 holds sucient cash. This occurs if the stage 2's markup (p 2 /c 2 − 1) is high and demand tends to be stationary. However, under increasing demand, it is optimal for stage 2 to order more in anticipation of future demand uprise. In this case, stage 2's cash constraint could become binding, especially if its markup is low. Thus, we need another lower bound to complement the performance of the CR bound.
Sample Path (SP) Bound
The diculty of solving Subsystem 2 comes from keeping track of the state w 2,t as the current period's w 2,t depends on the previous period's demand and order quantity. However, if we consider a specic demand sample path, w 2,t can be fully characterized by ow conservation. Lemma 2. Let d t (ω) represent the demand realization in period t given a demand sample path ω. With initial states w 2,1 and x 1,1 , we have w 2,t = ρx 1,t + B t (ω), where
The proof of Lemma 2 is similar to that of Lemma 1, and thus omitted. Given the initial states and a demand sample path, B t (ω) is a constant. If we replace w 2,t (according to Lemma 2) in both the constraint set and the periodic cost function, Subsystem 2 can be reduced to a two-stage serial system with deterministic demand subject to the following constraint (at time t):
The constraints state that stage 1's order decision y 1 is aected by stage 2's echelon inventory level x 2 ; stage 2's order decision y 2 is aected by a linear function of stage 1's inventory level x 1 . The optimal y * 1 and y * 2 can be obtained by solving a two-dimensional convex program in each period. To facilitate the computation, we prove that this problem can be decoupled into two one-dimensional convex programs.
represent the optimal cost for Subsystem 2 for any demand sample path ω after w 2,t is substituted with ρx 1,t + B t (ω). The following proposition shows the decoupling result.
We refer the reader to the proof for the detailed formulation of v 1 t and v 2 t functions. A lower bound to the optimal cost of the Subsystem 2 under the SP approach can be found by averaging total costs over all demand sample paths. In summary, we are able to generate two lower bounds the sum of the optimal cost obtained from Subsystem 1 and the optimal cost obtained from either the CR approach or the SP approach.
Optimal Transfer Pricing Model
For some multi-divisional corporations with a powerful headquarter, it is possible that the headquarter can determine transfer price to eciently distribute liquidity. This section extends the TP model to optimize the transfer price between the divisions. Notice that the optimal transfer price can be obtained by the optimal order quantity and the optimal cash payment in each period. Thus, we modify the transfer pricing model to incorporate the inter-division cash payment decision. For period t, dene m t = amount of cash payment paid from stage 1 to stage 2 before the demand occurs.
Then, the optimal transfer pricing (OP) model can be obtained by replacing p 2 z 1,t with m t in the TP model, as shown in Figure 6 (a).
Interestingly, solving the OP model is no harder than solving the CP model. More specically, we can follow the same logic of solving the CP model by dening a set of new echelon variables and cost parameters, making the original two-stage model transformed into a four-stage serial system. Figure   6 (b) shows the transformed system with division 2's and division 1's cash account being stage 3 and stage 4, respectively. Similarly, we can decompose the resulting four-state dynamic program into four separable, single-state dynamic programs. We refer the reader to Luo and Shang (2012) for the detailed analysis. In summary, we can obtain the exact optimal joint inventory, cash payment and retention policy for the OP model. The optimal transfer price is equal to the optimal cash payment divided by the optimal order quantity. Proposition 4. The optimal policy for the OP model can be described as follows. For inventory replenishment, both stages implement an echelon base-stock policy; for cash payment, stage 2 monitors its echelon working capital (x ′ 1 +x ′ 2 +w ′ 2 /c) and receives payment up to a target level; for cash retention, stage 1 monitors the system working capital and maintains it within an interval. We assess the value of cash pooling by comparing the optimal cost of the CP model, C * , with the lower bound cost of the TP model, C L = max{C R , C S }, where C R and C S represent the cost of the constraint relaxation bound and the sample path bound, respectively. Note that the value we obtain is a lower bound to the actual value. We dene the value of cash pooling as
This represents the percentage of cost reduction of the TP model if cash pooling is implemented.
We conduct a numerical study by starting with a test bed which has the time horizon of 10 periods. 2). In addition, two demand forms are considered. For the i.i.d. demand case, D t is Poisson distributed with mean µ t = 10 for all t; for the increasing demand case, D t is Poisson distributed with the rst period mean µ 1 = 10 and µ t increasing at a rate of 1.2 per period. In both demand cases, we x the liquidity level K ′ t = µ t . For each demand form, we generate 128 instances.
The total number of instances in the test bed is 256. The combination of these parameters covers a wide range of dierent system characteristics. For example, when (p 1 , p 2 ) = (2.5, 2) ((4, 1.2), respectively) the transfer price is high (low, respectively) compared to the retail price. For all cases we assume the initial on-hand inventory and cash level (x In this test bed of 256 cases, the average cost reduction of adopting cash pooling is 29.29%. More specically, the cost reduction is 13.62% when demand is i.i.d and 44.96% when demand is increasing. low (e.g., p 2 = 1.2). This is because under the i.i.d. demand, division 2 has to purchase inventory in each period to cover the (stationary) order received from division 1. With a low transfer price, division 2's average inventory procurement cost per period will be close to the average payment received per period. Thus, division 1 will not accumulate too much cash that leads to system ineciency (hence the value of cash pooling is small). On the other hand, with a high transfer price (e.g., p 2 = 2), cash pooling will then play a signicant role it will be better o to allocate more cash to division 1 so less cash will be accumulated at division 2. The value of cash pooling is more signicant when division 2 cash holding cost η ′ 2 increases as the excess cash will be charged with a higher rate. Under the increasing demand, the TP system will perform poorly when the transfer price is low.
More specically, as division 1 order size increases with the demand, ideally division 2 should in turn increase its inventory stocking to prepare for the future increasing order sizes. However, under xed transfer pricing, division 2 will not have sucient cash to do so due to its low markup (p 2 = 1.2). Caterpillar's strategy: After the nancial crisis, many suppliers of Caterpillar have diculty getting funds from external banks to stock up the raw material for the expected soaring demand. Thus, Caterpillar took a more proactive role to subsidize their suppliers (Aeppel 2010) . The value of cash pooling is clearly higher when backorder cost is larger. Figure 7 bed. For a xed selling price, the value of cash pooling is increasing in K, but the marginal benet of cash pooling decreases in K. Thus, cash pooling makes a more signicant cost improvement when K is small. In addition, we nd that p 1 and K complement each other's role as a liquidity source. For example, (K, p 1 ) = (8, 1.2) and (4, 1.5) yield a similar CP value.
We next examine the impact of demand volatility on the optimal mix between cash and inventory in a simulation study for the cash pooling model. Figure 7 (a) also shows that CR (SP) bound performs better in the upper left (lower right) quadrant.
holding is less sensitive to the change of demand variability than the inventory holding.
Finally, notice that the optimal base-stock levels obtained from the Clark-Scarf model is suboptimal to the TP model. Thus, our study suggests that ignoring the impact of nancial ow on the inventory decision will lead to a signicant cost increase when the nancial markets are not perfect. ′ is larger.) Second, cash pooling eliminates the lead time for the payment and allows cash to move bi-directionally to upstream or downstream, making the supply chain more responsive and leading to a smaller number of backorders. (Thus, the benet of cash pooling is more signicant when the backorder cost is high.)
Compared with the cost reduction with the xed transfer price tested in the previous section, the percentage cost reduction is relatively small when the transfer price is optimized. This suggests that optimizing the transfer price can retain a big portion of the benet achieved by adopting cash pooling.
This indeed is useful for rms if adopting cash pooling is not possible due to legal issues or cash shortage for investing in the costly nancial services platform.
It is interesting to see how the optimized transfer price helps to re-distribute the supply chain cash between these two divisions for rms facing a product life cycle demand. More specically, we consider a time horizon of 22 periods with Poisson demand in each period. The demand mean starts from 6, ramps up at a peak of 36, declines to 14 and remains there for the last 5 periods. These demand rates represent introduction, growth, maturity, and decline stages in a product life cycle (see Figure   8 ). To illustrate the transfer pricing dynamics, we consider a instance with p 2 = 1.25, p 1 = 1.5, b = 55, η ′ 2 = 0.15, h ′ 2 = 0.2, β ′ o = β ′ i = 0.05, K ′ = 0, and the other xed parameters in the test bed. We obtain the optimal transfer price as the optimal cash payment, m, divided by the optimal order quantity, z 1 in a simulation study and plot the average optimal transfer price in each period. Figure 9 shows the dynamics of the corresponding optimal transfer price from period to period. Notice that if the optimal transfer price p * 2 is larger than p 1 = 1.5, the price dierence can be viewed as nancial subsidy oered by stage 1; on the other hand, if p * 2 is smaller than the purchase cost c = 1, the price dierence can be viewed as delayed payment made by stage 1. Figure 9 provides an interesting insight on how to set up the optimal transfer price. Recall that this is a case with K ′ = 0, i.e., the source of stage 1's liquidity is completely from the sales revenue.
From the gure, we nd that during the introduction stage, the transfer price should be set to a value close to the selling price p 1 . This implies that division 1's cash should be moved to division 2, as the latter needs to spare more cash for material ordering. The transfer price declines slightly but ramps up quickly during the growth stage, reecting the fact that division 1 should even subsidize division 2 for material ordering. Finally, during the maturity and decline stages, division 2 does not need to reserve excess cash for material ordering, so the transfer price declines gradually. During the periods 13 to 17, the transfer price can be lower than the purchase cost c. We can view this as a payment reduction received by division 1 to compensate the cash subsidy oered to division 2 during the growth stage.
Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the benet of cash pooling for a corporation that owns a supply chain with two divisions. We quantify the value of cash pooling by comparing two cash management systems, repre-senting dierent levels of cash concentration due to the existence of the nancial services platform. We prove the exact optimal inventory and cash retention policy for the cash pooling model and construct a lower bound to the optimal cost for the transfer pricing model. We quantify the conditions under which investing in a nancial services platform that achieves cash pooling provides the most benet.
Our results can be extended to the system with general lead times, general number of stages, and
Markov modulated system parameters.
Our results contribute to dierent business disciplines as follows. For general management, we
show that an inter-departmental collaboration between accounting, nance and operations is crucial to ensure supply chain eciency. In addition, we characterize the conditions under which cash pooling will provide the most benets. For operations, we show that the inventory decision can be determined in the same fashion as that of the traditional inventory system if the cash can be pooled and managed centrally by the headquarter. Finally, for accounting and nance, we show that it is necessary to take inventory into accounting when making the cash retention decision.
The focus of this paper is to derive a centralized solution for supply chains with dierent cash management systems. This perspective is appropriate for a single-owner supply chain or a virtually integration supply chain (i.e., the entities in a supply chain share a common goal of optimizing the supply chain performance; see Porter (1985) ). Nonetheless, there are decentralized supply chains in which the entities are individual rms, each with its own interests. An important question for the decentralized supply chain is to design an incentive scheme in which each individual rm would choose the rst best solution. The centralized solution we obtain can be viewed as the rst best solution for this purpose. We leave this decentralized control issue for future research.
